From European to Global

Fri, 03 Feb 2012

The rigidity Germany showed in managing the Euro-crisis and the parallel unilateralism in its foreign policy are two faces of the same coin

The financial crisis begun in 2008 brought about a lot of changes in the world balance of powers and took its heaviest toll on the political and economic reality of Europe. One of the most evident effects of the crisis was its contribution to the increase in Germany’s prestige not only in Europe, but also in the world. Political events within the European Union over the last two years seem to have swayed the epicentre of European decision-making from Brussels to Berlin, now viewed as a sort of moral authority showing others, if not imposing, austere budgetary policies.

Ask around and you would be surprised of the increased notoriety of Angela Merkel among European citizens and of the parallel, growing obscurity of names such as “Herman Van Rompuy” or even “Manuel Barroso”. Some would object that French president Nicholas Sarkozy also enjoys authority on the European stage, however, the recent downgrading of France’s credit rating by Standards &Poor’s is likely to further strengthen Berlin’s voice in Brussels, making Sarkozy’s struggle for visibility and his chances to get re-elected as French president a more distant mirage.

The crisis represented an important watershed for Germany’s policy vis-à-vis the European Union in that it highlighted the profligacy of some EU member states such as Greece, Portugal and Ireland, fostering German public opinion’s impression that the country had to pay for others’ irresolute policies. According to some authors this attitude has always been latent in German imaginary ever since they were forced to give up their beloved D-Mark, considered by many as the symbol of post-war German economic success.

But while this sentiment is understandable, the narrative that Germany is sacrificing its finances to fix other countries’ financial and fiscal irresponsibility is utterly biased. While it is true that Berlin is the main financial contributor to the European project, it is also true - and many in the Bundestag fail to acknowledge this - that thanks to the single currency the Federal Republic was able to reap substantial economic benefits over the last decade.

According Sebastian Mallaby, director of the Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, while the Euro allowed Germany to achieve a tremendous growth in its export figures between 2009 and 2010 that would have been unthinkable with the Mark, it meant a loss of competitiveness for the peripheral economies. Therefore, Berlin should not scorn weaker economies and insist with austerity measures that risk to further cripple the economy of southern capitals, rather, it should pay more to save the currency union and agree to a more proactive role of the European Central Bank and to the increase of European Stability Mechanism (ESM) funds to 500 billion euro.

Soft-Power for a powerful softy?

The growing self-confidence of Germany and its booming exports, fuelled by increased trade with emerging economies, have turned the country into an “economic hegemon” that increasingly shapes its foreign policy according to commercial interests and for which the European internal market is becoming too small. This departure from the traditional multilateralism, on which the transatlantic post-war system and the provisions of Maastricht were predicated, has earned Germany international respect and “soft-power”. However, according to a publication by the German Council of Foreign Relations, to the climbing economic strength corresponded an ever declining defense spending; an evident symptom of Germany’s lack of “forward-looking foreign policy and security strategy”.

The fundamental change in Berlin’s foreign policy orientation became extremely evident in the spring of 2011 as Germany did not back the NATO action against the Lybian dictator Gaddafi. The decision laid bare the EU’s lack of a coherent and unitary foreign policy and was perceived as a move against Germany’s most important and natural allies in the West. This anti-war stance proved extremely hypocritical as in April 2011 the weekly magazine Der Spiegel reported that the German Security Council was planning to sell 200 Leopard tanks to Saudi Arabia, a country that was helping Bahrain to crush the revolts inspired by the Arab Spring.

Quo vadis Deutschland?

The events mentioned above display Germany’s present position in world affairs: a neutralist state ready to deliver weapons to authoritarian regimes but unwilling to take part in unpopular and risky military campaigns aimed at protecting innocent civilians from the retaliatory actions of unscrupulous dictators.

This tectonic shift of German foreign policy is sending dangerous seismic waves to the architecture of the EU and risks to jeopardise its future weight in international affairs. This is all the more true if we consider that by the middle of the century Europe will host only 6% of world’s population and its economy will account for only 30% of global output. As emerging nations strengthen their presence on the global stage, the Old Continent will have an increasingly modest voice.

Therefore, if the European Union wants to live in a future world shaped by the democratic values that it enshrines, it must pull itself together, neutralize its internal fragmentation and enhance its ability to become a coherent and effective geopolitical actor now while it still enjoys a relative global visibility. To do so, however, the EU needs a Germany ready to abandon its current unilateral and inward-looking path to become a determined foreign policy actor, prepared to also use military power if this is needed to defend the interests of the continent.

The decision to abstain from the Lybian campaign has inevitably put Germany on the side of Russia and China, two nations that reject democratic values on their soil and defend undemocratic regimes around the world. Is this really the image Germany wants for itself?

by Stefano Salustri