Merry England Turns Its Back on Europe

Mon, 30 Jan 2012

British euroscepticism feeds into the myth of the exceptional nature of the United Kingdom – what is the history behind the national feeling?

To the utter delight of British eurosceptics, David Cameron is said to have ordered a full English breakfast on Friday 9th December 2011 - the date marking one of the most important developments in Britain’s 38-year membership of the EU. Cameron had just vetoed a change to the Lisbon treaty that would introduce new fiscal regulations for EU members as a way of rescuing the common currency from demise.

Negotiations went horribly wrong as the UK insisted on a protocol allowing the City of London to opt out from a proposed change on financial services. On his return home Cameron was jubilantly greeted by the eurosceptic English press, but criticised by the Labour Party and even his coalition partners - the Liberal Democrats - did not hide their disaccord over the outcome of the Brussels summit.

It is still very hard to predict what the future holds, but the event could mark a point of no return between Britain and its relations with the EU. The ambivalence of the UK toward the European project has always shown, but with the progression of time it was clear that this was not an obstacle to seeking membership.

The words with which then French President Charles de Gaulle rejected the UK’s first application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 sound like a prophecy: “Britain is an insular, maritime nation, bound up by its trade, markets and food supplies with the most varied and often the most distant countries. She has, in all her work, very special, very original, habits and traditions. In short, the nature and structural circumstances peculiar to England are very different from those of other continentals.”

Unhindered by two a rejection in 1963 and again in 1967, the UK was finally accepted to the EEC in 1973. Yet, decades later, polls carried out by Eurobarometer consistently show the British are the least satisfied with EU-membership among the European countries. This has led to the European Commission setting up a permanent service in London to dispel the anti EU-bias the British media feed to the public on a daily basis.

How did the British diversity come about?

British euroscepticism is the result of history, geography, economy and culture. Some maintain this attitude towards the continent dates back to the time of the English reformation in the 16th century when Henry VIII broke with Rome. The true watershed of this divide, however, was the creation of the British Empire throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Extreme patriotism and imperial pride permeated British popular culture at all levels.

Despite the trend, it is not accurate to say that countries on the continent were characterised by an inward-looking history whereas Britain placed a greater emphasis on its Atlantic heritage and on trans-oceanic trade. Countries such as Spain, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands had sizeable empires overseas. The difference was that Great Britain extracted the most benefits from its imperial experience. Therein rests the root of this supposed English exceptionalism.

Since the 1850s the British economy has been significantly more internationalised than its major European counterparts. The British Empire was a formidable device for boosting intercontinental trade. Every region was specialised in the production of a particular item for export inside the Commonwealth. Within this system the motherland conserved the preeminent role of supervisor and power centre, allowing Britain to establish a role in globalization that is second only to that of the United States.

Under the banner of free trade, the City of London, the Bank of England and the Her Majesty’s (HM) Treasury were the three institutions that controlled financial capital and global investment. Apart from the HM Treasury, whose role was to remove all government restrictions to the business of financial capital, the City and the Bank of England acted as a sort of ‘private interest government’ - a state within the state.

In the aftermath of the Second World War and during the Cold War, the role played by the US was essential to the reconstruction of Western Europe and the reestablishment of the City of London as a major capitalistic hub. Britain once again shifted away from a model of nationally regulated capitalism to one where global finance was hegemonic.

The European project, however, posed two sets of problems that went straight to the heart of Great Britain’s social and economic arrangement. The UK was offered membership in a union of competitors, rather than partners, because of economic similarities with her European neighbours. This meant that big countries such as Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom had to compete internally and on an international level as industrial exporters and agricultural producers.

The other dilemma was that Britain preferred a model of hyper-liberal capitalism similar to that which was developed in the US, but in Europe capitalism had a kinder face as the states took charge of regulation.

The state of affairs represented a clash between two forms of opposing capitalism.

In its attempt to avoid another war, the European Union offered a lasting institutional solution to the conflicts that had disrupted stability on the continent. Co-operation was seen as the only way for European countries to maintain influence in a world dominated by superpowers. Yet for the United Kingdom more options seemed available - it still had a big colonial empire and the Commonwealth, and some thought it had a ‘special relationship’ with the United States.

Such a picture has changed rapidly over the years. The British Empire has dissolved and the much cherished ‘special relationship’ that presumably linked the two sides of the Atlantic is a doubtful concept. The United States has turned its attention to Asia, and China in particular, as the balance of power is giving way to the continent.

By vetoing a treaty change in the contemporary context, David Cameron is gambling the future of his country. Paradoxically, precisely what he tried to avoid could be forced upon him and the whole of the UK. The privileged position he intends to keep for the City of London could prove to be an impossible task to accomplish if new EU regulations shift the balance to favour other financial hubs such as Frankfurt and Paris. The British economy is too heavily dependent on the eurozone and does not have too much room for maneuver.

From a practical point of view the American corporations and the huge BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries have a strong interest in trading with a single European market, not a collage of 27 states. Cameron’s strategy could thus cost Britain very dearly. Even at home this revival of English nationalism is creating frictions with Scotland. The more the Tory-led government disengages the UK from Europe, the more the pro-European Scottish National Party will get loud on the diverging national interests between England and Scotland.

The United Kingdom seems to be suffering from the disease of ex-imperial nations in which idealism is the impossibility to fine-tune ambitions to a smaller reality. Until it wakes up, the UK is destined to drift in isolation in the Atlantic Ocean, contemplating its past glory.

by Alessandro Mancosu