Europe’s New Eastern Question

Tue, 24 Jan 2012

The EU and Russia battle for influence over Ukraine

The Eastern Question was a political, diplomatic and military rivalry between the Western powers and the Russian Empire throughout the 19th century for domination over the Ottoman Empire. Something similar might be going on between the European Union and the Russian Federation over Ukraine today.

Ukraine has a strategic importance for both Brussels and Moscow. It has a population of about 45 million, one of the largest territories in Europe and a strategic location between the EU and Russia. For the EU, Ukraine is a crucial part of its energy security. The country also has a substantial potential from agricultural and manufacturing point of view.

For Moscow domination over Ukraine is arguably the most important task for restoring its Soviet-era might. First, Putin wants to see Ukraine as a part of the Eurasian Economic Community, which is Russia’s answer to the EU. Second, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is harboured in the Ukrainian town of Sevastopol and Russia wants to ensure that it will stay there for decades to come.

Realizing his country’s importance for both sides, President Yanukovych has been trying to balance foreign policy between Brussels and Moscow to reap benefits from both sides. On the one hand, he has been trying to normalise relations with Russia to get cheaper gas. At the same time, he has been bringing Ukraine closer to the EU with the aim of obtaining free access to the EU’s common market, visa-free regime, new investments and eventually membership in the Union.

So far, the EU has been more successful than Russia in establishing deeper ties with Ukraine. In the framework of its Eastern Partnership program and the negotiations over the Association Agreement, the EU has won Ukraine’s loyalty in exchange for possible economic and political benefits. However, Brussels is interested not just in Ukraine’s loyalty to the EU, but also the country’s commitment to European values such as democracy and rule of law. This is a standard package of the EU policy with its neighbourhood countries. Although Ukraine is far from being a role model for a democratic state, the EU considered the country’s performance satisfactory enough to award it with the Association Agreement, which was supposed to be signed in December 2011. The agreement involves a free-trade zone and a relaxed visa regime with Ukraine.

However, the arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko in October 2011 turned the whole situation upside down. The court sentenced her to seven years in prison for misusing her powers when she was the Prime Minister. The political opposition in Ukraine declares this arrest to be politically motivated to ban her from the upcoming parliamentary elections.

While the EU has been largely reluctant to efficiently press the Ukrainian government for its serious democratic shortcomings in the past, the case of Tymoshenko is too big to ignore. For Brussels, this case demonstrates a clear lack of commitment from the Ukrainian government to democratic principles and the rule of law. The arrest was a slap in the face of Brussels which made the EU rethink its attitudes toward Ukraine. Top Brussels officials started to attach more significance to overall democratic conditions in in the country, particularly the independence of the judiciary, media and the respect for human rights.

As a result, at the EU-Ukraine Summit on December 19 of last year, the EU declared that signing and ratifying of the Association Agreement “will depend on political circumstances”. Despite that, Yanukovych does not seem to be willing to free his main political opponent. The stalemate does not work well for any of the two sides: the EU loses Ukraine, Ukraine loses the EU and the winner is… Russia.

Russia, unlike the EU, does not care much about Ukraine’s democratic credentials and is always ready to welcome Ukraine back to its “special sphere of interests”. There is a threat for Brussels that if it pushes too hard on Ukraine for the democratic changes and if it delays the implementation of the Association Agreement, the country might retreat back to its “good old” neighbor, just like Turkey turned its back to the EU after it became disillusioned about membership in the Union. The prospect of a cheaper gas, enhanced trade and a formidable size of ethnic Russian citizens living in Ukraine are enough reasons for the Ukrainian government to change its policy vector to the north. Moreover, without the European option, Ukraine loses much of its bargaining power against Russia and can be more easily influenced by Moscow.

This creates a dilemma for the EU. Europe has declared to adhere to the “stick” policy, stay a force for democratic change and delay the ratification of the agreement as long as Tymoshenko is kept in prison. The opponents argue that this stance is counterproductive and will only alienate Ukraine. Instead, to bring Ukraine back to the European track, they propose offering “carrots”: increased support for its pro-European policies, the ratification of the Association Agreement, through which they can better ensure democratic reforms and hold the government accountable, and the promise of an eventual membership in the EU if all the necessary conditions are met.

The outcome of this situation is significant not only for Ukraine, but also for the whole Eastern Partnership, where both the EU and Russia have their own rival interests. This is why, the way Brussels decides to act in this particular case may shape its neighbourhood policies in the future.

by Gela Merabishvili